These natives think this war to be their own: reflections on blacks in the Cape colony and the South African war, 1899-1902 by Nasson, Bill
"THESE NATIVES THINK THIS WAR TO BE THEIR OWN": REPUCTIONS ON 
BLACKS IN THE CAPE COLONY AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 1899-1902 
Bill Nasson 
Despite the growth in recent years of an historiography of African participation in 
the South African War (l), we remain relatively uninformed of the nature and extent 
of Afrikaner military penetration into the agrarian domain of black communities in 
the Cape Colony. For these groups, the unfolding of republican armed incursions, 
white rebellion and banditry, represented a period of considerable turbulence and 
trauma. At various phases of the conflict guerrillas asserted a territorial 
imperative, occupying small market towns and settlements in the interior and overrunning 
rural districts. This establishment of periods of Afrikaner military ascendancy 
subjected vulnerable fractions of black society to a violent process of conquest, 
submission and subordination within the power structures of Republican colonisation. 
In order to understand something of the structural context within which 
violence arose, we need to look closely at the agrarian arena. The arbitrary violence 
directed against the lives and capital of peasant producers, noted in passing by such 
authors as Colin Bundy (2), should not be seen as solely the consequence of moral 
levity towards African life and a propensity to disregard property rights when the 
owners were black. These elements were certainly there, and considerable weight must 
be attached to them; however, the armoury of repressive devices which Afrikaner 
guerrillas brought to bear against black communities and individuals ought not to be 
divorced from localised social and political conflict between black and white interests. 
The intrusion of wartime commando violence was a phenomenon which did not exist outside 
the spheres of property, power and settler authority in the colonial political economy: 
it was closely interwoven with them. 
In illustration of this, it is worth devoting some space to a brief exposition 
of developments at the Methodist mission station of Leliefontein in Nanaqualand. For 
a start, the experience of Leliefontein calls into question any remaining notion that 
the prosecution of the South African War was strictly a white manls prerogative, while 
on the peripheries of conflict a supine peasantry laboured to maintain cycles of 1 cultivation. Throughout 1900-1901 nomadic cultivators on the Nission reserve had become 
closely associated with the British militaxy. The war  set in motion a process of 
accumulation. A small number of producers disposed of their marginal surplus to army 
suppliers at inflated prices; they also hired out their labour as scouts and riders 
on a three-monthly contract basis. ( 3 )  P b y  of the more impoverished inhabitants 
completely forsook the reserves1 fragile,shifting cultivation with its tenuous margin 
between subsistence and pauperisation. Some accrued capital through lowterm 
employment as skilled labour with the Namaq.Lialand Field Force. Others sold their only 
visible economic assets - cattle, sheep and goats - and purchased wagons and mules 
with which to establish themselves as small transport contractors with the ~ 3 4 ~ .  The 
dimensions of this labour force were considerable. During July 1901-June 1902, 
upwards of 2007'Leliefontein Boys" were operating as scouts for the Namaqualland 
Intelligence Department. (4) On the heavilv used military convoy route between 
Carnarvon and Williston, labour from the Ldiefontein reserve provided 275 armed 
auxiliaries and 180 mule drivers. (5) This labour oscillation was so widespread as 
to impede partially the functions of the Missionfs administrative apparatus: 
important personnel were continually siphoned off for military duties. In Januasy 
lgOl the g (Mission Church council) reported that it had been unable to hold 
sessions for several months "owing to so many of the Raadsmen and Bur&ers being 
employed as scouts during the Great Boer War". (6) 
Small wonder that the mission station acquired for itself a reputation as a 
centre of sedition in a northwestern region in which the dominant Afrikaner land- 
owning interests were overwhelmingly Republican in political affiliation. The effect 
of the integration of hundreds of the reservels inhabitants into military agencies of 
the colonial state is obvious. The mission burghers were seen to be identifying 
themselves with an imperialist agency highly repressive of Afrikaner interests in the 
colony. This evolving situation was one which m a y  be said to have been reasonably 
provocative of some reprisal from the substantial commando presence in the region. 
Moreover, there were deep-rooted and acrimonious disputes between predatory white 
farmers and clerical authority at the station over the question of labour supplies. (7) 
By the turn of the century it was still possible for the bulk of Leliefonteinfs 
nomadic agriculturalists to extract a tolerable level of independent subsistence from 
the reservels shrinking lands (8); proletarianization was fiercely resisted. 
Throughout the 1890s, white Methodist staff appeared to have done little to commend 
to their congregation the virtues of the wage relation; instead, burghers were 
supported in their hostility towards degrading labour conditions prevailing on white 
fams. (9) 
These tensions between agrarian capital and the reserve were deepened after 
1900: labour flowed from the station, but not in the desired direction. In order to 
stem similar migration from the lands of white Republican collaborators, harsh 
controls were instituted. The labour force on farms which covertly supplied guerrillas 
with provisions was marshalled into work gangs by commando overseers and subjected to 
a particularly brutal work regime; those who resisted, informed, or deserted, were 
threatened with death. (10) This intimidatory strategy merely encouraged widespread 
desertion of service, and scores of farm labourers took refuge at the station. (11) 
Furthermore, employees deserted other white farms and took up temporary residence as 
refugees in the reserve; from there they moved on to less burdensome and more 
lucrative employment as skilled anqy workers. The local farming lobby charged 
Methodist personnel with spreading insubordination among the rural workforce, and with 
explicitly encouraging farm labour to break wage and debt relations. (12) In the 
words of one representative, J. J. van Reenen, who wrote on 22nd February 1901, after 
a tour of the Garies district: "The farmers all along the line complained to me .,, 
that their servants and labourers deserted their service, left them in the lurch and 
fled into the Institution of Leliefontein where this appears to be enc~uraged.~~ (13) 
The refusal by the station to expel labour deserters created friction between 
Methodist authorities and the state bureaucracy, which strove to prevent labour supply 
levels from sinking to the point where it might seriously impair the rate of settler 
accumulation. (14) 
What we have, then, is a steady degeneration of relations in the area. The 
local landowning class was much disturbed; it was experiencing what might legitimately 
be termed a crisis in its authority to maintain bonds of deference and obedience. 
That authority was being increasingly eroded by developments at the Leliefontein 
reserve. Roving bands of guerrillas were furious at burgher resistance to their labour 
and produce demands and by the reserve's seemingly unequivocal loyalty to the British. 
'J?hro@out 1900-1901 sporadic commando activity bore portents of violence to come. 
Leliefonteinls British military auxiliaries - scouts, drivers and despatch riders - 
were flogged and shot as a matter of routine when they had the misfortune to fall into 
Afrikaner hands. Pastoralists on the fringes of the reserve were subjected to 
physical harrying, and had agricultural implements destroyed. Finally, in January 
1902, a guerrilla force under "Made" Maritz struck deep into the station. The only 
published account of what is supposed to have taken place is that provided by Deneys 
Reitz who, in Commando, suggests that Maritz "had ridden into the station with a few 
men, to interview the European missionaries, when he was set upon by armed Hottentots, 
he and his escort narrowly escaping with their lives. To avenge the insult, he 
returned next morning with a stronger force and wiped out the settlement." (15) 
Limitations of space preclude a blow-by-blow account of what occurred; we 
should, however, note the main procedural features, as they are significant. 
After the missionaries had been forcibly detained by Maritz, a large 
crowd of Basters were compelled to assemble before the mounted commando. A number of 
handmitten proclamations were distributed: these were of a routine kind, issued by 
maqy guerrilla groups throughout the colony. Highly threatening in tone, they 
laboriously catalogued the reprisals meted out to "kaffir~~~ ca-t aiding the 
British. (16) In terms of immediate and specific local considerations, it is evident 
that the Maritz commando was also acting as the coercive instrument of Afrikaner 
farming interests; labour deserters on the reserve were ordered to return to their 
masters on pain of death. (17) As part of an apparent strategy to refurbish the 
weakened fabric of Afrikaner agrarian authority, the invaders also articulated a 
olitical dispensation. Maritz invited Basters to swear an oath of loyalty to 
Lrikaner republicanism (18), and even at his most threatening still held out the 
option for burghers to enter a collaborative relationship, and be assimilated into the 
Afrikaner forces. An intelligence despatch of 11th January reported: llMaritz read #a 
proclamation to the wlarmed Bastards. He forbade them on pain of death to give any help, 
information or fox- to the English, and promised them protection. Wounded Bastards 
by his orders were to be sent to Garies for treatment, and he stated that passes would 
be given to all to leave the station and assist the Boer cause . . . Bastards would be 
given land and cattle by the Boers." (19) 
The assembly was not swwed by these inducements; the crowd remained in a 
bellicose mood, and when two of Maritzls subordinates tried to address it the Basters 
pelted them with fruit and shouted them down. (20) In this gesture of defiance they 
were led by two influential members of the m, Jan Dirks and Barnabas Links. Links 
had apparently had dealings with the commando before. As one of its members wrote 
subsequently of the confrontation: "Among the encircling audience was recognised with 
pleasure, the face of Barnabas Links, as one of the natives captured at Garies in 
September 1901, who, it was thought, after a beating, and according to his oath, had 
now come back to live in peace at Leliefontein." (21) In fact, Links had not been 
dormant. With Dirks and other members of the E he had been instrumental in the 
secret formation of a small resistance force, armed mostly with antiqvated muskets. 
When advance notice was received on 3rd Jan- of Maritsfs proposed incursion, these 
men were mobilised. (22) In particular, the _Raad wanted to protect the substantial - 
central reserves of wheat and rye, a portion of which had been set aside as the food 
supply for refugees squatting on mission lands. This grain store was also an important 
source of capital at a time of inflated market prices. With good reason the reserve 
authorities nursed long..staulding suspicions that guerrillas were intent on plundering 
this surplus. (23) 
After several bitter exchanges between Maritz ayld the two 
representatives, the commando leader apparently produced a sjambok and dismounted. 
The jostling crowd produced two knobkieries, with which Dirks and Links attacked 
Maritz. They were immediately shot, and the assembly rapidly dispersed. The reserve's 
amed auxiliaries took to the hills to cut off the Afrikaner retreat; in the ensuing 
series of clashes, seven Basters and thirty guerrillas died. (24) Four more 
Afrikaners were reported to have been stoned to death. (25) Maritz beat a hasty 
retreat and returned with an enlarged force; before he reappeared, virtually the 
entire Baster community sought refuge in the hills. Clearly, whatever cards were being 
stacked, those of the burgbers were at the bottom of the pack. The occupying force 
wreaked havoc. Dwellings were gutted, muskets smashed, and wooden furniture and sheds 
consumed as firewood. The means of production - stock and agricultural implements - 
were either destroyed or expropriated. The granary was plunaered and landowners in 
the Springbok and Garies districts absorbed a large portion. Similarly, ploughshares 
were hauled off to white farms in the vicinity. (26) Much of the transportation was 
undertaken by bywoners and landless llpoor white1! rebels, recruited from the 
impoverished margins of local settler society. For their assistance they had been 
rewarded with mules and wagons seized from the station. (27) Understandably, this 
poor white retinue was almost everywhere highly predatory. The war unleashed for them 
considerable opportunities for accumulation, through their role in the expropriation 
of black cultivators who fell foul of Afrikaner military force. 
As for the Baster refugees, reports throughout March, April and May speak 
of their being harassed, hunted down and conscripted into forced labour gangs, in order 
to maintain a level of agricultural production to meet the subsistence requirements of 
the large Maritz force. By 18th April, at least 1,800 refugees had trekked to Garies 
and 010kiep. (28) In the ensuing weeks, hundreds more followed. Replying simply to 
a query from General French about the refugee influx, the commander of the 
Namaqualand Field Force wrote on 15th May: "The people have nowhere to go. The Boers 
have burnt Leliefontein. " (29) 
The best evidence for the selective use of violence by Afrikaner guerrillas 
arises from scores of premeditated executions of individual civilians. We can advance 
one such case here: that of Abraham Esau. Although much of the evidence is 
conflicting and difficult to evaluate, we must attempt to reconstruct the plcture as 
best we can. Esau, a blacksmith and prominent pro-British activist in Calvinia, 
appears to have been at the vortex of hostilities between the settlementfs African 
a,nd Coloured inhabitants and marauding guerrillas who were active in the district 
during the greater part of 1900-1901. Alarmed by a rising tide of rural intimidation, 
Esau and a group of fellow Coloured artisans volunteered during October l9OO to 
mobilise and officer a black town guaxd, in order to police Calvinia and its immediate 
environs. (30) This proposal was declined by magistracy officials based at 
Clanwilliam. (31) The colonial bureaucracy was ever mindful of the danger of 
alienating settlers by permitting military authority to accrue to independently 
organised native auxiliaries. Ominous events at Barkly East during November and 
December 1899 bore heavily on the mind of the Acting Resident Magistrate. (32) 
Rebuffed by the local bureaucracy, Esau proceeded to forge direct links with 
the imperial armed forces. Commencing on 5th November 1900, he set about constructing 
a clandestine cell of spies and informers which filtered intelligence through to 
British units. In return, he appears to have accepted a flimsy promise of military 
protection for the black community in the event of a major commando assault. (33) 
Calvinials Afrikaners seem to have been largely unaware of the nature of this 
infoml pact; there was much speculation and rumour that the supply price for Esauls 
services was the provision of Krugerrands and weaponry. (34) Leading directly on from 
this were persistent reports (mainly based on inference and hearsay) that the 
blacksmith and his artisan associates were stockpiling rifles at a secret arsenal, in 
preparation for a rising. Growing sural drift from the land, precipitated by guerrilla 
exactions, swelled the ranks of discontented blacks in the settlement and Esau was 
accused of spreading "insurrection" among the mob. By December 1900, according to a 
confidential British intelligence report, Esauls activities had provoked "great 
suspicion and hostility" among guerrilla leadership as far afield as Fraserburg, 
Williston and Casnarvon. (35) 
When an Orange Free State commando swept into Calvinia in January 1901, Esau 
was almost immediately incarcerated by a landdrost appointed to implement Republican 
native law in the occupied district. m e  pretext for this was his reported refusal to 
wear a pass, with which all blacks in Calvinia were issued from 22nd Januazy. (36) 
Efforts to coerce him into divulging the location of the rmmured cache and publicly 
to renounce his British allegiance seem to have been unsucceeaflzl. Afrikaner malice 
was intensified by a flurry of accusations from white landowners that Esau had 
authorised the maiming of stock belonging to known Republican sympathisers and had 
encouraged acts of arson on farms. After protracted public floggings on at least 
three consecutive dws, Esau was by all accounts left bloody but unbowed. His 
intransigence probably speeded up final retribution. On 5th February 1901, he was 
strapped between two horses, dragged for three quarters of a mile beyond the town 
limits axd shot dead by a guerrilla called Strydom. (37) Esauls demise removed an 
important focus of civil opposition to Afrikaner military power, which had always 
vigorously to assert and extend its authority over an implacably hostile populace. 
Furthermore, the execution served notice upon the community that any further show of 
resistance to commando authoriQ would be treated as a capital matter. 
The incident created a minor scandal in the colony, and here it might be 
useful briefly to note its impact. Seized upon by sections of the settler press (38) 
and by British mission journals (39), the Esau murder was also taken up in the 
imperial metropolis by such publications as Lloyds Weekly Newspaper, which on 20th 
Februazy l9Ol argued that "Esauls fate calls for retribution. He has suffered cruel 
martyrdom for no worse crime than loyalty to the Briti~h'~. The case also became the 
topic of correspondence involving both Chamberlain and Milner. (40) The Commissioner 
I 
was in high dudgeon over the affair, and admitly manipulated its propaganda value; 
l on 19th February he wrote: 
Nothing more disgraceful has happened in modern war 
than the treatment of the coloured man Esau at Calvinia. 
Whether they have actually murdered him, I do not yet 
know. What I do know is that they flogged him till he 
fainted, for the offence of being loyal to the British 
Crown, he being born and bred a British Subject. The 
man is well known to me by correspondence, and is known 
to my staff personally. Though coloured he was a most 
respectable, upstanding, and for his class in life (a 
village blacksmith) superior man - far more civilised 
than the average Boer farmer. (41) 
Various implausible explanations accounting for Esaufs death were offered by newspapers 
sympathetic to the Republican cause. By far the most unlikely was that postulated by 
the South African News which ventured that his interrogators had been forced to shoot 
him in self-defence (!I when he assaulted them. Abraham Esau, the E blustered, had 
been "a man of gwat physical ~treng-th'~. (42) Finally, Esauf S martyrdom (for such it 
rapidly became) featured conspicuously among the array of wartime atrocity stories 
which circulated among the hustings during the 1904 election. Settler politicians [z 
representatives of the DO) exploited the episode. It was claimed that Esau had been 
an exemplary representative of non-white patriotism towards the colonial state, and had 
died selflessly in defence of British interests. Jameson's Progressives insisted that 
the lesson black voters could draw from Esauls fate was that only an electoral alliance 
between them and a staunchly pro-imperialist settler faction would entrench black 
rights against encroachments by a conjunction of hostile political interests - perhaps 
collusion between the Afrikaner Bond and the South African Party, which in the post-war 
period was accused by Progressive opponents of being the "Afrikaner Bond in sheepls 
clothing". (44) In this whirling propaganda battle, Esau was hi&* serviceable, and 
the example of his grisly end dangled before enfranchised blacks. This anti-Afrikaner 
strategem was mainly employed against the Bond, especially in constituencies where the 
Progressives were fighting to secure Coloured votes. (45) 
l 
l The Esau case touches upon the question of Afrikaner military overrule, and 
1 provides a useful point at which to turn to a lengthier consideration of this process 
l 
l of conquest. For entire communities in interior zones which were temporarily overrun 
I and staked out as Republican enclaves (46), the ordeal was especially sharp. 
Republican seizures bit deep into the social and political fabric; the routine, random 
plundering of peasant surplus, and disruption of the continuities of production and 
accumulation represented no more than the topsoil of conquest. It is wholly misleading 
to think of these successive waves of localised invasions solely in terns of 
indiscriminate rapine. Guerrilla commandants went to considerable lengths to impress 
upon black inhabitants of occupied territory that the armed invasion forces were not 
there purely as the military wing of the trekker states. Their encroachment was also 
explicitly political in intent. Men like &itzin.gwr, Olivier and Lotter appeared as 
bearers of a form of white power based (in theory at least) on the outright 
expropriation of blacks in the colony, and on racial superiority. (47) Through the 
distribution of written proclamations, public addresses and instructions to headmen, 
inhabitants were informed of their subjection to the sanctions of what was loosely 
termed Republican native law. Presumably intended in part to provide a legitimating 
basis to the imposition of military power, "Republican native law1! proved to be a 
pliant political construction, subsuming within its rubric all manner of coercive 
measures, ranging from disenfranchisement to the systematic extraction of surplus. 
The question of the attack upon the non-white franchise is interesting, and 
deserves comment, not least because, as Stanley Trapido has pointed out, white 
parliamentary factions halted serious talk of contracting black franchise rights for 
virtually a decade spanning the turn of the century, including the years of the 
South African War. (48) However, Republican invaders with a premature whiff of 
victory in their nostrils were obviously not constrained by considerations of 
electoral arithmetic (49) from launching an aggressive assault upon suffrage rights. 
This seems to have arisen predominantly in agrarian districts where insurgents, with 
a collaborative base provided by local white rebels, established firm phases of 
military ascendancy. This enabled them to generate an apparatus of bureaucratic 
controls (liepublican field cornets, landdros ts , native commissioners, and so forth) 
which reproduced in microcosm some of the dimensions of the Afrikaner state. 
It was in these areas - for example, in and around Dordrecht, Lady Grey, 
Jamestown, and Aliwal North - during November-December 1899 that Republicans went 
most purposefully and systematically along the path of expropriation. Here the threat 
of African dispossession specifically included the stripping away of political ri&ts. 
A rapid glance at events in Jamestown during November 1899 reinforces the point well. 
Shortly after Commandant Olive2 wept into the settlement on 18th November, a 
detachment of his men made for the location. After conducting a fruitless search for 
four policemen from the Jamestown African constabulary suspected of having taken 
refuge there, Olivier installed armed guards on the location perimeters to prevent 
anyone leaving. (50) The location headmen were seized and forced to join local 
bywoners in assisting guerrillas to marshal together the black populace and assemble 
them in the location. (51) The round-up appears to have been thorough. The assembly 
included scores of refugee peasants (who had previously suffered enforced dispersal, 
or had fled the land to escape being pressed into labour drafts), seven Indian 
itinerant petty traders, and three Coloured wheelwrights. (52) After outlining curfew 
regulations, the planned extraction of tax payments, requisitioning of property, and 
the institution of a pass system, Olivier announced that, as Jamestown had fallen under 
Republican jurisdiction, suffrage rights for "Kaffers, Kleurlingen en Koelies" would 
immediately be revoked. A fundamental axiom of the new political process would be a 
racially exclusive franchise. (53) The Commandant appears to have possessed a keen 
appreciation of the rituals of repression: disenfranchisement was expressed through 
an ordered procedure (operating from 20th November-2nd December 1899) in which 
registered voters were ordered to report to a landdrost where their hands were 
specially stamped and they were issued with a m) 
Although the evidence is patchy, it would appear that the bulk of 
disenfranchisement threats were articulated in the north-eastern region of the colony. 
It can hardly have been coincidental that this was a significant reservoir of African 
electoral activity; here the peasant vote was still resilient and substantial. It 
was also here that the political nexus between peasant producer and the urban, 
mercantile appropriator of his product received its clearest expression. The main 
local forces of settler discontent were Afrikaner farming interests, traditionally 
hostile to liberal, mercantile advocates of imperial control, and a surplus producing 
peasantry. (55) During the periods of Republican sway, Afrikaner farmers in the 
triangular region bounded by Aliwal North, Barkly East and Queenstown played a 
substantial role in the new relations of domination. Cormando leadership delegated a 
whole range of sub-military functions to them: for example, they administered passes 
and collected hut tax payments. (56) And, as a mass of treason trial proceedings bore 
subsequent testimony, these local rebels were deeply involved in the process of 
ltstrippingll b acks of the franchise, (57) A ready instance can be drawn from the 
Barkly West district, where in 1898 an alliance between Rhodes and the Koloniale Unie 
had mobilised the African and Coloured vote against the Afrikaner Bond - which 
singularly failed to make inroads into the black vote. In the closing weeks of 1899 
a motley group of white civilians, with military support from a commando escort, 
toured the lands of Barkly East peasants, boasting of an imminent reversal of 
parliamentary political fortunes. Afrikaner landowners among them claimed that a Bond 
representative would be installed by the new regime, and. Africans would lose their 
vote. (58) Very similar propaganda exercises were orchestrated in Aliwal North and 
in the Herschel Reserve, where, as an indication of the manner in which Republican 
conquest was reshaping the terrain of white power, there was talk of redistributing 
expropriated African votes among unfranchised llpoor whitesI1 aszd bywoners. (59) It 
would, I think, be wrong to view this onslaught upon the franchise as having 
constituted mere rhetoric and bluster on the part of temporarily installed rulers. 
If one makes even the most cursory appraisal of African perceptions, it is obvious 
that peasant voters did not re@ it in this light, For commodity producers, the 
summary lllossm of the franchise was traumatic. It signalled the end of a whole range 
of civil liberties, &,in the Republican scheme of things, their legal assimilation 
to the category of cheap (or unpaid) labour power for white agrarian capital. To 
Cornelius Olifant, I1a native farmer1' from the Douglas district, may be left some 
appropriately painful remarks: 
I was on my land putting potatoes and pumpkins in bags 
for sale to the Ehglish soldiers when some Free State 
men rode up about the middle of November last (1899). 
With them were Jacobus Maree of the fam 'Witfonteint 
and Abraham Cronje of the farm IWonderfonteinl . Ma.ree 
said my vegetables and fowls and six of my goats would 
be given to the Boer soldiers. I asked for pwent as 
my goats were worth fully £1.50~ each. He said I would 
be given about Is for each goat as all land was now 
Orange Free State property and natives could not make 
their own prices. Cronje also told me that I was now 
under the laws of the Orange Free State and made me 
put my name on a piece of paper with the names of other 
better class natives here which was a sign that my vote 
was taken away. When I did not want to do this thing 
Maree and the Free State Boers said they would shoot me. 
I was very afraid to lose my vote as I would then have 
no rights and just be a common native and have to work 
as a slave for these white men. These Boer soldiers who 
came here to steal our goods and our ri&ts as civilised 
natives were not even white men really, but many had some 
native blood in them, they were not really white men, 
just Boer natives. (60) 
Olifantls 3- neatly illustrates the sense of crisis browt about by Republican 
conquest. Commando military intervention in the Cape was in part very much a matter 
of the extortion of provisions and labour. Here blacks were everywhere the victims. 
For a fraction of the peasant community these incursions also threatened much prized 
political and social ri&ts. For the high point of these invasions was the 
application of political violence in the fonu of forcible disenfranchisement. 
Military occupation browt in its wake a predator state apparatus, which, 
however thin and flimsy, strove continually to enlarge its own labour and fiscal 
demands over settled agrarian populations. As we have already noted, coama,ndos 
became the instruments throw which a constellation of local white interests mediated 
l their hostilities. There is a readily discernible pattern to this: it was, for 
example, commonplace for farmers to bring recalcitrant labour before landdrosts for 
disciplining (61), and for Indian traders to be expelled from occupied villages where 
l white traders sympathetic to the Republicans were promised absolute trading 
I monopolies. (62) At Kuruman and Douglas during December 1899-January 1900, bywoners 
l were permitted to confiscate dozens of ploughshares from peasant holdings, the 
I commando native commissioners announcing that Orange Free State lllawell permitted only one ploughshare per native family. (63) Very often there were attempts to put a 
juridical gloss on the paraphernalia of repression. 
African commodity producers faced the prospect of degradation into captive 
labour at one stroke, while wage labourers were being riveted down at a time when 
inflated wages in the military sector were drawing thousands to camps and depots. It 
was perhaps inevitable that sections of white farming capital would make common cause 
with invading military forces; commandos could enforce labour compulsion and thereby 
maintain levels of accumulation, and also recuperate surplus from squatter peasants, 
many of whom claimed that tenancy oblications need not be honoured in the case of 
"enemies of the Queen". (64) It should be emphasised here that colonial district 
officials, far from being the compliant filters of Afrikaner agrarian interests, did not 
held as a wartime political priority the protection of their labour supply. Control 
oTer the amount of labour siphoned off white farmland by the military was often extremely 
lax. The colonial state alsb intervened in the process of labour distribution, toenforce 
sanctions against dissident settlers. To cite an extreme example, magistracy personnel 
at Herschel barred Africans from labouring on Barkly East farms during a period from l9OO 
to 1901, in an apparent effort to impede the production of landowners wide1 suspected of 
sympathising with, and secretly provisioning, rebel forces in the Cape. (653 
Blacks reacted violently to what many of them saw as a process of Afrikaner 
colonization. To say that the desperate struggles which were unleashed on the land 
bore some of the elements of agrarian class warfare would not be an exaggeration. 
African reaction took the form of muffled, localized forms of resistance against 
commando penetration in disturbed areas. Supervised labour drafts on Republican 
farms waged constant struggles agaonst commando overseers and their landowning allies. 
The range of resistance was extremely varied, and can only be briefly noted here. 
Desertion, poisoning of drinking water, and the maiming of stock was widespread. 
Particularly sharp measures were undertaken by semi-independent cultivators bent on 
reclaiming expropriated proper*. Thus, during l900 it appears that a number of 
autonomous armed levies, outside the controlling domain of the British Army and 
colonial militia, were operating in certain north-western districts of the colony. 
Lukas Plaatjie and Pieter Bok, two Basters from the Garies area, became celebrated 
thief-takers, hunting down (mainly poor white) perpetrators of such routine rural 
felonies as stock theft. These two men led a band of twenty Baster smallholders who 
apprehended thirty-two white suspects during August-November 1900. (66) Bok and 
Plaatjie were cornended by an officer of the Namaqualand Field Force during December 
1900, who afterwards recorded his impressions of them: 
These fellows are very keen on upholding justice and the 
law. Even if their methods are r o w  this is all to the 
good. The infernal low class whites who are so swelled 
up by the presence of armed Boers in these parts are a 
seat menace to nigger property. They seem to think they 
can steal freely from Bastards. It pleases me that this 
bunch of natives will not put up with Boer cheek. Bok 
and Pladkie have in them the spirit of John Wild and 
mi&t even teach our English poachers a thing or two. (67) 
The formulation that blacks in the Cape Colony were uniformly loyal to 
imperial interests has long been a conventional one for historians. For fractions of 
the African and Coloured petty bourgeoisie, inhabitants of larger urban settlements 
well removed from the cutting edge of Afrikaner military power, this is undoubtedly 
an accurate appraisal. In return for supporting an expansion of imperial state 
machinery. into South Africa's hinterland, they anticipated that the question of black 
political ri&ts would shift to a more prominent position in the locus of political 
power. At the very least, an expansion of British political resources would see the 
Cape liberal franchise extended to the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. 
The notion of black collaboration becomes less useful when we consider 
agrarian communities. Firstly, that both peasant and proletarian components of the 
rural order met fully British d e m d s  for labour and commodities is not in itself a 
fully convincing index of collaboration. Transport riders,who comprised a substantial 
proportion of the armyls skilled labour force, defined their relationship in strictly 
contractual terms. (68) Hi& wages and inflated commodity prices in general provided 
a secure fiscal underpinning to labour attachments to remount, transport and 
intelligence departments. Secondly, the adaptive stance which particular peasant 
g~oups took up during the war was never simply one of voluntw loyalty to imperial 
interests. Resistance to the Afrikaner war effort in the colony was forced upon them 
by periodic tides of white invasion which attempted to effect radical shifts in the 
balance of localized social forces on the land. An alignment with the colonial state 
was a significant defensive posture. The scores of self-proclaimed "government men" 
who fought bitterly against Afrikaner forces which lay hard upon Cape blacks were 
defending their own stake in the colonial order. Sections of the rural tenantry armed 
as farm auxiliaries and drawn into a defence of English landowning interests were 
often protecting not merely the property of white masters but their own productive 
surplus, which was frequently indistinguishable from that of their landlords. Certain 
labour service and sharecropping agreements marked out the squatter peasantry as 
logical targets for Afrikaners striking at the capital of English fanners. The 
penetration of commando power became associated with prohibitions, eviction, 
dispersal and the leeching of hard won capital through harsh taxation. Theee were 
all powerful threats to already shrinking enclaves of peasant autonomy, to entrenched 
notions of petty proprietorship, and to ideologies of political liberalism, of the 
free market, and of free men, which became passionately supported values for blacks 
made suddenly subordinate to new structures of alien authority. 
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